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JURISDICTION 
This is a petition for judicial review of a final order resulting from a formal 
adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Career Service Review Board. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues for judicial review in this petition are: 
A. Whether the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) erred in upholding the 
Department's termination of Mr. Yardley5s employment after finding that the 
written warning, the Department previously issued Mr. Yardley pursuant to its own 
policy was not enforceable and that the warning did not apply to the conduct for 
which Mr. Yardley was terminated. 
B Whether the CSRB erred in upholding the Department's termination of Mr. 
Yardley's employment by finding that although the Department did not follow its 
practice of utilizing committee reviews in terminating Mr. Yardley, the 
Department nevertheless fulfilled the fundamental requirements of due process. 
C. Whether the CSRB erred in upholding the Department's termination of Mr. 
Yardley's employment after finding that the Department's investigation of the 
allegations against Mr. Yardley was in accordance with their practice of 
conducting an investigation as part of the disciplinary process. 
D. Whether the CSRB erred in upholding the Department's termination of Mr. 
Yardley's employment in finding that the Department, pursuant to its own policy, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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acted consistent with similar disciplinary actions it has previously taken in 
terminating Mr. Yardley's employment. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews an agency's application of its own 
policies for reasonableness and rationality, according some, but not total deference 
to the agency. Lunnen v. Utah Department of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
Preservation of Issue on Appeal: TheCftah Career Service Review Board issued its 
Decision and Final Agency Action on December 23, 2004. Mr. Yardley filed his 
Petition for Review of Final Agency Action with this Court on January 19, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Yardley was a state career service employee employed by the Utah 
Department of Corrections (Department) as a correctional officer. Approximately three 
months after he was disciplined for sexual misconduct that he recorded on a video tape, 
he was notified by the Department of their intent to terminate his employment for sexual 
misconduct that he recorded on a video tape that predated his prior discipline. Mr. 
Yardley challenged the Department's action and was afforded a pre-termination 
proceeding. Following the proceedings, Mr. Yardley was served a Final Order from the 
Department notifying him that his employment was terminated. Mr. Yardley challenged 
the termination through the Utah Career Service Review Board. Following an evidentiary 
hearing before a hearing officer, his termination was upheld. Mr. Yardley appealed the 
hearing officer's decision to the Career Service Review Board which upheld the hearing 
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officer's decision. Mr. Yardley now seeks judicial review of the Career Service Review 
Board's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For a number of years, rumors were being discussed at the Department's Central 
Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF) that video tapes were being circulated that contained 
images of Mr. Yardley and his wife engaged in sexual conduct. (RT.299:68). In October 
2000, the Department received information that the video tapes that were the subject of 
the rumors had surfaced and they contained not only images of Mr. Yardley and his wife 
engaged in sexual conduct, but also Mr. Yardley masturbating in a guard tower at CUCF, 
and images of CUCF staff members walking about CUCF property. (RT.299:68). Gary 
Ogilvie, a Department investigator, was assigned to investigate the information 
concerning the video tapes. (RT. 299:70). As part of the investigation, Mr. Ogilvie 
interviewed Mr. Yardley and Travis Clark, another employee at CUCF who supposedly 
had information about the video tapes. (R.370; RT.322:62, 68). During the interview, Mr, 
Yardley acknowledged that the video tapes included images of him masturbating, 
engaging in sexual conduct with his wife and masturbating in the guard tower. (R. 374-
377). Prior to being interviewed by Mr. Ogilvie, Mr. Clark informed CUCF 
administration that the video tapes contained images of Mr. Yardley masturbating with 
various objects, masturbating in the guard tower on CUCF property, engaging in sexual 
conduct with his wife and of third parties in a non-sexual context. (RT. 322:12-15). Mr. 
Clark informed CUCF administration that he had a copy of a video tape. (RT. 322:26). 
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Mr. Clark provided the same information to Mr. Ogilvie during his interview that he 
provided to CUCF administration. (RT. 322:24-25). Mr. Ogilvie completed a written 
report of his interviews that discussed Mr.Yardley's conduct that both parties disclosed. 
(R. 372). 
During his investigation, however, Mr. Ogilvie never obtained the video tapes 
because he was under the belief that they were destroyed. (RT. 299:101). He 
acknowledged that he nevertheless should have asked for the video tapes. (RT. 299:102). 
Furthermore, Mr. Ogilvie learned through his involvement with the current matter that 
resulted in Mr. Yardley's termination that other video tapes did exist, but he 
acknowledged that he simply did not ask for the video tapes. (RT. 299:102). According 
to Travis Clark, when Mr. Ogilvie interviewed him, he had a video tape and he was 
prepared to produce the video tape, but was surprised that Mr. Ogilvie did not ask for it 
since he told administration that he had a video tape. (RT. 322:25-26). Further, Mr. Clark 
believed that other video tapes existed and if asked he would have informed Mr. Ogilvie 
of his belief. (RT. 322:26). 
As a result of Mr. Ogilvie's investigation, on January 12, 2001, the Department 
issued Mr. Yardley an Administrative Complaint that notified him of their intent to 
suspend him for 15 days without pay. (R. 344-346). The Administrative Complaint 
contained the following language: "You are hereby warned that should this type of 
misconduct reoccur in the future, we will be forced to consider severe disciplinary 
sanctions, including termination." (R. 345). On March 5, 2001, a Final Order was 
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executed implementing the 15 day suspension without pay sanction and noted: "Mr. 
Yardley's failure to contest the allegations and sanctions is considered agreement with the 
allegations and acceptance of the sanction." (R. 347). According to Scott Carver, then the 
Department's Director of Institutional Operations, the warning issued to Mr. Yardley is 
used pursuant to Department policy and relied upon by the Department to determine 
subsequent levels of discipline. (RT.304:12-14, Addendum A). The Department's intent 
in issuing the warning is to correct employee misconduct, but if not corrected, the 
warning is relied upon to determine subsequent levels of discipline for the employee. (RT. 
304:15-16). The Department uses the warning to set a standard of conduct that the 
Department expects from the employee and, in turn, what the employee can expect from 
the Department. (RT. 304:16). 
As part of correcting Mr. Yardley's misconduct identified in the January 12, 2001, 
Administrative Compliant, he was required to participate in a "performance plan" to 
monitor and correct his behavior. (RT. 302:33-37). Mr. Yardley was performing well in 
the performance plan. (RT. 302:39). The performance plan is used by the Department to 
bring closure to the matter. (RT.302:34-35). 
Despite Mr. Yardley's performing well in the performance plan, and the 
Department's intent to bring closure to the matter by implementing the performance plan, 
Mr. Yardley was served on June 14,2001, with another Administrative Complaint. It was 
executed by Mr. Carver and notified Mr. Yardley of the Department's intent to terminate 
his employment that is the subject of this Petition. (R. 353). The Administrative 
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Complaint was subsequently amended by Mr. Carver on July 9, 2001. (R. 350-352). The 
Administrative Complaint was not based upon alleged misconduct that occurred after his 
15 day suspension wherein Mr. Yardley was warned by the Department that they would 
consider termination if he committed the same misconduct in the future. Rather, it was 
based upon alleged misconduct that predated not only the January 12, 2001, 
Administrative Complaint, but predated even the October 2000 commencement of the 
investigation on that Complaint. According to the Amended Administrative Complaint, 
the last date of alleged misconduct is September 11, 2000. (R. 350-352). 
Upon learning of the Administrative Complaint notifying Mr. Yardley that the 
Department intended to terminate his employment, Beverly Thomas, the Deputy Warden 
who was administering Mr. Yardley5s performance plan, reacted with "shock." 
(RT.302:41). Ms. Thomas was shocked because the administration supervising Mr. 
Yardley had not been consulted prior to Mr. Yardley being served with the Administrative 
Complaint leading to her belief that the Department was not aware that the matter had 
already been addressed. (RT. 302:41). Ms. Thomas testified that based upon her 
knowledge of Mr. Yardley's prior discipline and her review of the current matter that 
resulted in Mr. Yardley's termination that is the subject of this petition, Mr. Yardley was 
terminated for the same type of conduct and information that served as the basis for his 
prior discipline. (RT. 302:47). Ms. Thomas testified: "Right. I based that on the 
Amended Complaint that was filed in June and July, because they referred all the 
incidents that we were addressing back in October." (RT. 302:47). Mr. Ogilvie, also 
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testified that the conduct on the video tapes for both Administrative Complaints were of 
the same type. (RT.299:107-108). Indeed, even the referral from a Warden Smith to 
investigate the complaint that resulted in Mr. Yardley's termination commented that the 
matter was related to the prior investigation. (RT.299:78). 
According to Mr. Carver, the Department maintains a policy and practice of 
conducting an investigation of alleged acts of misconduct prior to creating the 
administrative compliant that initiates the disciplinary process. (RT. 304:6-11). The same 
was also testified to by the Department's then Executive Director, Mike Chabries. (RT. 
301:24-25). Pursuant to the Department's policy and practice, on June 1, 2001, a referral 
was sent to Gary Ogilvie to investigate the allegations that led to the June 14, 2001, 
Administrative Complaint that resulted in Mr. Yardley's termination. (RT.299:110). On 
June 11, 2001, Mr. Ogilvie obtained a video tape that was provided by Brian Barker who 
made the complaint, but did not speak with him. (RT.299:111). On June 12, 2001, Mr. 
Ogilvie contacted and spoke with Brian Barker. However, it was not an interview that 
was done as part of an investigation, but rather to simply get to know Mr. Barker. (RT. 
299:111). On the same day Mr. Ogilvie spoke with Mr. Barker, he reviewed the video 
tape acquired from Mr. Barker with Mr. Gallegos. (RT. 299:112-113). After viewing the 
video tape with Mr.Gallegos, Mr. Ogilvie was instructed by Mr. Gallegos to suspend his 
investigation and to not proceed further, and that the investigation would be handled by 
the Attorney General's Office. (RT. 299:82). Mr. Ogilvie acknowledged that up to June 
12th he had not really conducted any investigation, but only picked up the video tape 
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from Mr. Barker and spoke with him. (RT. 299:131). Mr. Ogilvie testified that he did 
not really start the investigation until July 2, 2001, two weeks after the Amended 
Administrative Complaint was already served upon Mr. Yardley. (RT.299:130). The 
Attorney General's Office did conduct an investigation, but their investigation was only 
assigned to an investigator on June 14, 2001, the same day the Department served Mr. 
Yardley with the Administrative Complaint notifying him of their intent to terminate his 
employment. (RT. 299:25). 
The Department maintains established procedures for processing disciplinary 
actions against employees. (RT 304:7-9). The Department first conducts an investigation 
into the allegations the reports of which are then forwarded through committee reviews. 
(RT. 304:8-10). The first review is at the "division level" that includes the Director or 
Institutional Operations, the wardens in the subject employee's chain of command and 
bureau chiefs. (RT:304:10). At the division level, the committee discusses the facts of the 
case, related issues and aggravating and mitigating circumstances that include a 
discussion of prior disciplines and warnings issued to the employee. (RT. 304:10-14). 
After discussing the various issues, the committee makes a recommendation for 
discipline. (RT. 304:11). The case then goes through another review at the Department 
level. (RT. 304:11). The Department committee includes a representative from each 
division within the Department, including a representative from human resources. (RT. 
304:11). The Department committee reviews the consistency of the discipline 
recommended by the committee at the division level. (RT. 304:11). 
8 
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According to Mr. Carver, Mr. Yardley's case should have followed the 
Department's procedures and should have been subject to the committee reviews. (RT. 
304:18-19). That process would have allowed the Department to scrutinize the propriety 
of the decision to terminated his employment. (RT. 304:18). However, the Department 
did not follow its procedures and, consequently, Mr. Yardley's case did not go through 
any committee reviews. (RT.302:41-43). According to Beverly Thomas, the warden over 
Mr. Yardley, the entire administration that she is apart of was completely unaware of the 
Department's decision to terminate Mr. Yardley and they were not consulted consistent 
with Department procedures. (RT. 302:41). According to Ms. Thomas, such an event has 
never occurred in her 20 years with the Department. (RT. 302:42). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
What occurred in this case became fairly clear once all the evidence regarding the 
Department's termination of Mr. Yardley's employment was heard. The Department 
terminated Mr. Yardley's employment after they viewed images of Mr. Yardley engaged 
in sexual conduct recorded on a video tape. However, apparently because of the 
offensive nature of the images, the Department acted hastily and disregarded their own 
procedures that would have ensured proper consideration and handling of the termination. 
As a consequence, the Department denied Mr. Yardley due process resulting in a 
fundamentally unfair termination. 
Several months prior to being terminated, the Department disciplined Mr. Yardley 
for sexual conduct that he recorded on video tape that involved images of himself 
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masturbating, some of which occurred in a guard tower, and engaging in sexual conduct 
with his wife. The investigation was less than thorough and it was evident. No video 
tapes were requested or recovered, although they existed, and the extent of the images and 
the circulation of the video tapes were not pursued. Nevertheless, the Department 
preserved Mr. Yardley's employment, imposed a 15 day suspension of his employment 
and issued him a broad warning. Contained in the Administrative Complaint, the 
Department warned Mr. Yardley that if he engaged in the "type of misconduct" in the 
future, the Department would consider terminating his employment. The discipline was 
finalized in a final order dated March 5, 2001, and the terms of the discipline thereafter 
became an enforceable term of the employment relationship between the Department and 
Mr. Yardley. After being disciplined, Mr. Yardley committed no further acts of 
misconduct and was participating and doing well in a performance plan the Department 
implemented to correct his misconduct and bring closure to the incident. 
On June 14, 2001, the Department served another administrative complaint on Mr. 
Yardley that was amended on July 9, 2001. It informed Mr. Yardley of the Department's 
intent to terminate his employment. The basis that was identified were images of Mr. 
Yardley engaged in masturbation with various objects and in a guard tower that were 
recorded on video tape. The complaint noted that it was for acts that occurred after 1995 
and 1998, the dates noted on the first complaint, but made no mention of any distinction 
in the "type of misconduct" from the conduct relied upon by the first complaint. 
Furthermore, the dates of the acts relied upon, while subsequent to 1995 and 1998, did not 
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occur after the first complaint that warned Mr. Yardley of a termination if he committed 
the same type of misconduct in the future. In fact, the last date relied upon is September 
11,2000, which not only predates the first complaint, but even the investigation on the 
first complaint. By terminating Mr. Yardley5 s employment for the same type of conduct 
for which he was previously disciplined, and for conduct that did not occur after his prior 
discipline, the Department fundamentally violated the warning resulting in an unlawful 
termination of Mr. Yardley5 s employment. 
Mr. Yardley challenged his termination through the Career Service Review Board. 
During the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Yardley learned that the Department failed to follow 
its procedures in handling his case in two principle regards. Specifically, the Department 
failed to conduct an investigation prior to initiating the disciplinary procedures against 
him and failed to utilize committee reviews to review his case. As a result, the 
Department failed to investigate whether the conduct for which he was terminated was 
conduct that he was already disciplined for, and Mr. Yardley5 s case was denied the 
benefit of committee reviews where his supervising warden would have stated that the 
conduct was already addressed in his prior discipline. 
Finally, the evidence presented at the hearing persuasively demonstrated that the 
Department has not acted consistently in its disciplines when compared to Mr. Yardley5 s 
case. 
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ARGUMENTS 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16, an appellate court shall grant relief only 
if the employee has been substantially prejudiced by, inter alia, an employer' erroneous 
interpretation or application of the law or if the employer acted inconsistent to its own 
rules or prior practice, unless the employer can justify the inconsistency by presenting 
facts or reasons that provide a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b- 16(d) and (h). In this case, Mr. Yardley has been substantially prejudiced 
by the Department when, in terminating his employment, they violated a legally 
enforceable prior warning they issued to Mr. Yardley and by violating their own 
procedures and practices without justification. 
THE WARNING IS AN ENFORCEABLE TERM OF MR. YARDLEY'S 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEPARTMENT 
THAT THEY VIOLATED IN TERMINATING HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
In Kent v. Department of Employment, 860 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1993), this Court 
noted that "[t]he purpose of due process is to prevent fundamental unfairness." Id. at 987. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed that notion as it specifically refers to the obligations 
that a public employer must honor and act in accordance with in managing its employees. 
Relying and adopting the holding from a Washington Supreme Court case, the Court 
held: 
Therefore, we hold that if an employer, for whatever reason, creates an 
atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of specific 
treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced thereby to 
remain on the job and not actively seek other employment, those promises 
are enforceable components of the employment relationship. We believe 
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that by his or her unilateral objective manifestation of intent, the employer 
creates an expectation, and thus an obligation of treatment in accord with 
those written promises. 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah 1992). 
When the Department first disciplined Mr. Yardley on March 5, 2001, prior to 
terminating his employment they included a warning in the Administrative Complaint that 
led to the March 5, 2001, discipline that stated: "You are hereby warned that should this 
type of misconduct reoccur in the future, we will be forced to consider severe disciplinary 
sanctions, including termination." (R. 344). After receiving the Administrative 
Complaint, Mr. Yardley did not contest the allegations contained therein resulting in an 
acceptance of the discipline. (R. 347). Thereafter, Mr. Yardley was required to 
participate in a performance plan that was intended to correct his misconduct and close 
the incident. (RT. 302:34-39). The warning was included as part of the discipline process 
pursuant to Department policy and relied upon by the Department to determine the level 
of subsequent discipline, if necessary. (RT. 302:13-15). The Department uses the 
warning to set a standard of conduct that it expects from the employee and what the 
employee can expect from the Department. (RT. 302:13-15). Accordingly, by 
disciplining, but preserving Mr. Yardley's employment and warning him what the 
Department would do should he commit the type of misconduct in the future, the 
Department created an "atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of 
specific treatment in specific situations". As a consequence, pursuant to Thurston, the 
Department assumed "an obligation of treatment in accord with those written promises" 
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with the warning becoming an "enforceable component" of Mr. Yardley's employment 
relationship with the Department. 
The CSRB's ruling that the warning was "simply an attempt by the Department to 
express its expectation concerning [Mr. Yardley's] future behavior" is directly contrary to 
the holding in Thurston. As the Thurston Court stated: if the "employer, for whatever 
reason" creates an "enforceable component" of the employment relationship, the 
employer is obligated to act in accordance with and honor that component. Accordingly, 
the CSRB's ruling that the warning was only an expression of expectation of future 
behavior is contrary to law and, therefore, is not reasonable nor rational. 
Furthermore, the reasoning the CSRB used to conclude that the warning is only an 
expression of expectation of future behavior substantively undermines its ruling. The 
CSRB reasoned that the warning was only an expression of expectation because Mr. 
Yardley never fully disclosed what was on the video tapes during his interview and 
investigation that led to his first discipline. Beyond the fact that the record reflects that 
Mr. Yardley was cooperative in the interview and answered every question put to him. 
(R. 373-377). The CSRB's reasoning not only shifts the burden of the investigation from 
the Department and the investigator to the subject being investigated1, but also conditions 
the enforcement of any terms of the employment relationship not upon the law, but upon 
what the employee being investigated discloses. The Thurston decision did not provide 
1
 During an interview, the subject is only required to answer all questions honestly. See, 
In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas v. United States of America, 40 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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for such an exception to its holding. The opposite is true. Once the employer creates the 
atmosphere of fair treatment, any promises therefrom become binding thereby obligating 
the employer to act in accordance with those promises. 
With the warning being an enforceable component of Mr. Yardley's relationship 
with the Department, the Department was required to act in accordance with its terms. It 
is undisputed that Mr. Yardley did not commit any of the conduct for which he was 
terminated after he was issued the warning. If that were the case, the warning would have 
clear application justifying his termination. After all, he was warned. The opposite is 
true, however. Mr. Yardley committed no further similar acts or any acts of misconduct 
and was performing well in the performance plan that he was required to participate in 
following the first discipline. (RT. 302:38-39). Indeed, according to the Amended 
Administrative Complaint, Mr. Yardley was being terminated for conduct that predated 
the first Administrative Complaint. The date of the last conduct identified was September 
9, 2000, four months prior to first discipline. (R. 350, 351, 352). Thus, in determining 
whether the Department acted in accordance with the warning, the issue is whether the 
type of conduct for which Mr. Yardley was terminated is of the type for which he was 
previously disciplined. If it is of the same type, then the Department acted contrary to the 
warning because they promised to only consider terminating his employment if he 
committed the same type of conduct in the future. 
During the evidentiary hearing, the Department contended that the conduct for 
which Mr. Yardley was terminated was different from the type of conduct for which he 
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was previously disciplined and the CSRB agreed.2 However, the Department's position 
and the CSRB's ruling do not comport with the common meaning of the language used in 
the warning and ultimately are not supported by evidence. Based upon the language used 
in the warning, the issue is not whether the conduct was the same or identical to the 
conduct for which Mr. Yardley was previously disciplined. Rather, the issue is whether 
the conduct was of the same "type." Thus, the conduct could very well be different or 
dissimilar. However, if the conduct for which Mr. Yardley was terminated was the same 
"general character" or has a "common trait or characteristic" to the conduct for which he 
was previously disciplined, then the conduct for which he was terminated is the same type 
that he was previously disciplined for. American Heritage Dictionary, 3rd Ed., Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1992. 
A review of the evidence demonstrates that the conduct for which Mr. Yardley was 
terminated was indeed the same type of conduct for which he was previously disciplined. 
During the hearing, the Department called Gary Ogilvie as a witness. Mr. Ogilvie is a 
Department investigator who was involved in the first investigation of Mr. Yardley and 
the current matter. (RT. 299:67-70, 76-77). During that investigation, Mr. Ogilvie was 
made aware of rumors that were circulating around the Department that a video tape 
existed containing images of Mr. Yardley masturbating in a guard tower, engaging in 
sexual conduct with his wife and also images of Department employees in non-sexual 
1
 On page 7 of the CSRB Decision and Final Agency Action, the CSRB erroneously 
quotes the warning using the word "kind" instead of "type". 
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contexts. (RT. 299:68). Mr. Ogilvie further learned that the images were on two video 
tapes, one dated in 1995 and the other in 1998. (RT.299:71-72). Neither video tape was 
recovered or reviewed by Mr. Ogilvie. (RT. 299:72). The 1995 video tape was 
accidentally distributed by Mr. Yardley's to another employee of the Department and was 
never recovered, but is believed to have been copied and distributed to others by that 
employee. (R. 374). The 1998 video tape was distributed to Travis Clark, another 
Department employee, who returned it to Mr. Yardley who then destroyed it. (RT. 
299:72-73). During his interview with Mr. Yardley, Mr. Ogilvie was informed that the 
video tapes contained images of himself masturbating, engaging in intercourse with his 
wife and masturbating in a guard tower. (RT. 373-377). Evidently, Mr. Ogilvie was 
satisfied with Mr. Yardley5s general verification of the sexual acts. Mr. Ogilvie did not 
ask Mr. Yardley for any details of how he committed the sexual acts, the number of times 
the acts were committed or even whether video tapes were copied and continued to be 
circulated. (R. 373-377). 
In the current case, Mr. Ogilive testified that after viewing the video tape he 
believed that it contained images that were different from those that he was aware of from 
his first investigation. (RT. 299:81). Mr. Ogilvie created a written outline that describes 
the images contained on the video tape that he recovered from Brian Barker, who 
originated the complaint. (RT.299:79-80,84-85). The descriptions describe a series of 
images of Mr. Yardley masturbating with various objects, some of which occurs in the 
guard tower, and images of third parties in a non-sexual context. (R. 333-335). The 
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descriptions created by Mr. Ogilvie are consistent with the testimony of Jesse Gallegos, 
then the Department's Deputy Director, who also testified that the video tapes contained 
images of Mr. Yardley masturbating with various objects. (RT. 299:82). 
In comparison, the images of Mr. Yardley on the video tape are the same type of 
image that he was previously disciplined over. They are acts of masturbation recorded on 
video tape. The images are of the same "general character" and certainly share a 
"common trait or characteristic" through Mr. Yardley's behavior. The fact that the 
images on the video tape showed Mr. Yardley masturbating with different names on his 
penis or with various objects does not change the "type" of conduct. The act of 
masturbation is the general character of the images that is also the common trait in the 
conduct for which he was first disciplined and subsequently terminated. Indeed, Mr. 
Clark testified that the images on the video tapes that he was questioned about by Mr. 
Ogilvie during the first investigation contained images of Mr. Yardley's masturbating with 
various objects. (RT.322:13-15). Ultimately, the evidence support that not only was the 
conduct in Mr. Yardley's first discipline the same type of conduct for which he was 
terminated, the video tapes are all part of the same conduct and basis for his first 
discipline. 
Furthermore, beyond actual comparisons of the conduct, the two witnesses who 
were aware of the conduct in the first discipline against Mr. Yardley and his termination 
testified that the conduct in both instances were the same type. Beverly Thomas, Mr. 
Yardley's supervising warden, and Mr. Ogilvie each testified that the conduct in both 
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cases were the same type, but different dates. (RT. 299, 108-109; 302:45-47). The CSRB 
ruling was critical of the testimony from both witnesses saying that the testimony was 
taken out of context and any reliance on their testimony was misplaced. (CSRB Final 
Order p. 14). However, the testimony from Ms. Thomas and Mr. Ogilvie was in response 
to the very issue at hand: was the conduct for which Mr. Yardley was terminated the same 
type of conduct for which he was previously disciplined. Thus, the context of their 
testimony is precisely what is at issue and was not taken out of context. 
Finally, the CSRB concludes their ruling by noting that if they were to rule to the 
contrary it would encourage employees to withhold information to be protected from 
subsequent discipline. The CSRB's reasoning is myopic and misguided. The warning 
was drafted by the Department, not Mr. Yardley. If the Department wanted to preserve 
the option to further discipline Mr. Yardley, or any employee, they need only be more 
circumspect in drafting the warning to make clear that the employee would be subject to 
further discipline if the Department learns of other conduct not disclosed. Evidently, in 
Mr. Yardley's case, the Department chose not to do so and instead, "for whatever 
reason," chose to draft a broad warning that they must now act in accordance with. 
It is undisputed that the conduct for which Mr. Yardley was terminated predated 
his first discipline that resulted in the written warning at issue. The only dispute is 
whether the conduct was of the same type for which Mr. Yardley was previously 
disciplined. The CSRB ruling that the conduct was not the same type is not reasonable 
nor rational. The conduct was of the same kind and class and shared common traits and 
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general character. Consequently, the evidence strongly supports that the conduct for 
which Mr. Yardley was previously disciplined and the conduct for which he was 
terminated was a pattern of conduct that shared common traits all of which were copied 
on video tape. As an enforceable component of Mr. Yardley's relationship with the 
Department, the Department was obligated to act in accordance with the warning. By 
terminating his employment in a manner contrary to the warning, the Department violated 
an enforceable term that is part of the conditions of Mr. Yardley's employment. The 
Department's termination of Mr. Yardley's employment was therefore fundamentally 
unfair and consequently a violation of his due process rights. 
THE DEPARTMENT FAILED TO FOLLOW ITS OWN 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES THEREBY VIOLATING 
MR. YARDLEY'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
In processing Mr. Yardley's termination, the Department violated his due process 
rights in two fundamental respects. First, the Department failed to follow its established 
procedure of using committee reviews in the disciplinary process. Second, the 
Department failed to follow its procedure of conducting an investigation of the 
allegations prior to initiating the disciplinary process. In reviewing the Department's 
actions, the CSRB ruled that although the Department failed to follow its practice of 
using committee reviews in terminating Mr. Yardley's employment, the Department 
nevertheless met the "fundamental requirements" of due process. Therefore, the CSRB 
concluded the Department's failure to use committee reviews did not violate Mr. 
Yardley's due process rights. However, the findings that the CSRB's ruling relies upon 
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and the reasoning that it uses to conclude that the fundamental requirements of due 
process were met are not reasonable nor rational. Furthermore, the CSRB's ruling fails to 
consider the harm Mr. Yardley suffered as a consequence of the Department failing to use 
committee reviews. Similarly, the CSRB's finding that the Department conducted an 
investigation is not supported by the evidence. 
A. FAILURE TO USE COMMITTEE REVIEWS: 
In making its ruling, the CSRB did not take issue with whether the Department 
was required to use committee reviews in terminating Mr. Yardley's employment. For 
good reason. The law is well established that a public employer must adhere to its 
policies, procedures and practices in disciplinary proceedings against an employee. 
Thurston, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992). As the Thurston Court recited: "Once an employer 
announces a specific policy or practice, especially in light of the fact that he expects the 
employees to abide by the same, the employer may not treat its promises as illusory." Id. 
at 169. (Citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984). 
Rather, the CSRB found that because Mr. Yardley was afforded a pretermination 
proceeding where he was able to raise the issues that would be taken up in committee 
reviews, his due process rights were protected. The CSRB relied upon Lucas v. Murray 
City, 949 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1997) where this Court held that an employer's strict 
compliance with its policies and procedures are not necessary where the employer 
otherwise fulfills the "fundamental requirements" of due process. The CSRB's reliance 
upon Lucas is misplaced. 
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In Lucas, this Court found that although the Department did not provide Lucas 
with written notice of the charges, he did receive actual notice of the charges and was 
afforded a pretermination hearing where he addressed those charges. Thus, the principled 
purpose in providing written notification of the charges was met through the employee 
receiving actual notice of the charges. In Mr. Yardley's case, no committee reviews ever 
occurred and no proceedings that functionally served their purpose ever occurred. 
Moreover, Mr. Yardley suffered significant harm as a consequence of the committee 
reviews not occurring. 
According to Scott Carver, the Department's then Director of Institutional 
Operations and the administrator who executed the Administrative and Amended 
Administrative Complaint served upon Mr. Yardley, the use of committee reviews is an 
established procedure used by the Department. (RT. 304:8-10). There are two levels of 
reviews. The initial review is at the "division level" that includes Mr. Carver, the warden 
in the employees chain of command, and bureau chiefs. (RT: 304:10). The second review 
is at the Department level and is comprised of division administrators and a Department 
human resources representative. (RT. 304:10). There are several purposes for the 
committee reviews that include an analysis of the factual support for the allegations, 
consideration of employment history, consideration of mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances and prior disciplines and warnings. (RT. 304:12-14). They allow the 
Department administrators to consider issues of consistency, standardization and 
22 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
propriety of sanction. (RT. 304:8). The committee reviews occur after an investigation 
and lead to the notification of the charges to be issued. (RT. 304:10-16). 
In finding that the pretermination proceedings satisfied the purpose of committee 
reviews, the CSRB relied upon a part of the disciplinary proceedings that fulfill a part of 
the process distinct from that part served by the committee reviews. The pretermination 
proceedings not only follow the committee review process, but are proceedings that will 
occur or not conditioned upon the committee review process. The fact that the 
committees consider the factual support for the allegations makes that clear, let alone 
their consideration of other aspects that are particularly relevant to this case concerning 
prior disciplines and warnings. Thus, unlike Lucas where the employee had actual 
knowledge of what the written charges would have informed him of, the pretermination 
proceedings do not fulfill the purpose of the committee review process. The later is 
wholly dependent upon the former and, therefore, one cannot reasonably nor rationally 
satisfy the other. 
Furthermore, the committee reviews are performed by Department administrators 
who deliberate over several important issues related to the discipline in arriving at the 
decision to discipline. That is substantively and fundamentally different from the 
pretermination hearing. The committee reviews are a deliberative process by 
administrators who engage one another leading to a decision, while the pretermination 
hearing is an adversarial process designed to challenge and defend the decision made by 
the committee reviews. Indeed, even Mr. Carver testified that Mr. Yardley's case should 
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have gone through committee reviews and he believed it did. (RT. 304:16-18). In that 
regard, the Department not only failed to act in accordance with its procedure of using 
committee reviews in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(40(h)(iii), but Mr. 
Carver's testimony precludes any finding that the Department justified its inconsistency 
upon facts or reasons that provide a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency. 
Mr. Yardley was substantially prejudiced and harmed by the Department's failure 
to utilize committee reviews. Unlike Lucas who suffered no harm because he had actual 
notice of what the written charges would have informed him, Mr. Yardley's case was 
denied the exchange of information between administrators that the committee reviews 
were specifically designed to cause. As Mr. Carver testified, among the issues considered 
are the prior disciplines and warnings the employee has been issued. (RT. 304:12-13). 
That is particularly germane in this case considering the warning the Department served 
upon Mr. Yardley in the first discipline. Ms. Thomas, Mr. Yardley's warden who would 
have participated in committee reviews if they had occurred, would have been able to 
provide the committee with her information that she believed that the basis for his 
termination was the same conduct for which he was already disciplined. (RT. 302:45-47). 
That would have impacted the discussion on the warning. Furthermore, Ms. Thomas 
would have been able to discuss the Mr. Yardley's successful participation in the 
performance plan and the fact that it was designed to bring closure to the matter. (RT. 
302:34-39). Thus, by denying Mr. Yardley's case the benefit of committee reviews, the 
Department denied his case the exchange of information among administrators who 
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would have discussed the material issue in this Petition with the administrator providing 
information favorable to Mr. Yardley. The remarkable nature of the Department's failure 
to use committee reviews in Mr. Yardley's case is best summed up by Ms. Thomas who 
testified that she has never experienced such a process in her twenty years with the 
Department and that the administrator's in charge of Mr. Yardley were entirely denied 
involvement in the process. (RT. 302:41-43). 
The CSRB's ruling that because the Petitioner enjoyed pretermination 
proceedings, the Department's failure to utilize committee review did not violate his due 
process rights is not reasonable nor rational because the pretermination proceedings do 
not fulfill the purpose of the committee reviews. While the Department may not be 
obligated to strictly follow its procedure and practice of using committee reviews, neither 
can it treat those obligations as "illusory." The pretermination proceedings fundamentally 
are different from the committee review and cannot replace their role. Furthermore, Mr. 
Yardley was materially harmed by the Department's failure to utilize committee reviews. 
Thus, it was not simply a technical violation that was otherwise satisfied, but rather a 
constitutional violation that cause material harm. Finally, the CSRB's reliance on 
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) to conclude that as 
long as Mr. Yardley's substantial interests are protected a technical violation of the 
disciplinary procedure is not actionable is without merit. The Court in Piacitelli made 
very clearly that they were "construing a contract, not declaring statutory or constitutional 
rights." Id.at 1066. Therefore, Piacitelli has no application to this case. 
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B. NO INVESTIGATION WAS PERFORMED. 
Conducting an investigation is also an established procedure that is part of the 
Department's process in disciplining employees. Mr. Carver testified that after an 
incident is reported, it is referred for investigation. (RT. 304:7-8). Following the 
investigation, the investigative reports are forwarded to and used in committee reviews. 
(RT. 304:9-11). Mr. Ogilvie, a Department investigator testified similarly. Mr.Ogilvie 
testified that the Department has an established procedure in disciplinary matters that start 
with a referral of misconduct leading to an investigation that results in an investigative 
report being generated and forwarded to Department Administration. (RT. 299:119-120). 
Accordingly, as an established procedure in the disciplinary process, the Department is 
required to conduct an investigation. Thurston, 835 P.2d at 169. 
The CSRB ruled that the Department completed an investigation. The CSRB 
found that when Mr. Ogilvie and Mr. Gallegos, the Department's then Deputy Director, 
reviewed a video tape that Mr. Ogivlie obtained from a Brian Barker on June 12, 2001, 
the investigation "began and ended." The evidence, however, does not rationally 
support the CSRB's conclusion. When Mr. Ogilvie and Mr. Gallegos viewed the video 
tape, they were considering the referral of the matter for investigation and did not 
substantively or procedurally conduct any investigation. Indeed, the information Mr. 
Ogilvie learned in receiving the referral even identified the areas of investigation that 
were needed. 
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Mr. Ogilvie testified that when he met with Mr. Gallegos to view the video tape on 
June 12, 2001, he was ordered to discontinue and terminate his investigation and that the 
investigation would be handled by the Attorney General's Office. (RT. 299:82, 124). Mr. 
Ogilvie acknowledged that prior to that point all he had done was to pick up the video 
tape and speak with Mr. Barker who provided the tape. (RT. 299:131). Mr. Ogilvie 
further acknowledged, however, that what he had done prior to June 12 was not an 
investigation and that he did not really start any investigation until July 2, 2001. (RT. 
299:130). In fact, according to Mr. Ogilvie's testimony, when he viewed the video tape 
on June 11th or 12th, he initially thought it was related to his prior investigation of Mr. 
Yardley, but by the end of viewing the video tape, he believed he had new matter that 
needed investigation. (RT. 299:126-129). However, because of the order to discontinue 
his investigation he did not resume any investigation until July 2nd, a date after Mr. 
Yardley was already notified by the Department of their intent to terminate his 
employment. (RT. 299:129). The totality of Mr. Ogilvie's testimony establishes that all 
he and Mr. Gallegos did was to consider the referral and not a completion of any 
investigation. (RT. 299:76, 126-127). 
The information Mr. Ogilvie acquired in receiving the referral further underscores 
the CSRB's find that an investigation was completed by the Department. Mr. Ogilvie 
was informed by administration in his prior investigation of Mr. Yardley and from 
interviewing Travis Clark, a witness, that the video tapes for which Mr. Yardley was 
ultimately disciplined contained several images of Mr. Yardley and his wife engaging 
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sexual conduct, Mr. Yardley engaging in masturbation in the guard tower, images of 
Department staff members in a non-sexual context and Mr. Yardley masturbating. (RT. 
299:68-74). In testifying at the termination hearing in the present case, Mr. Ogilvie 
acknowledged that the conduct for which Mr. Yardley was terminated was the same type 
of conduct for which Mr. Yardley was already disciplined. Furthermore, Warden Smith, 
who initiated the referral in the present case, also wrote Mr. Ogilvie a memorandum 
wherein he discussed his concern that the matter may be related to Mr. Yardley's prior 
discipline and asked Mr. Ogilvie to investigate that issue. (RT. 299:78). Additionally, 
after Mr. Ogilive viewed the video tape provided by Mr. Barker, he became aware that 
copies of the video tapes had been made and that dates contained on the video images 
were not in chronological order. (RT. 299:80-81). That information reasonably raises 
issues regarding the integrity and authenticity of the video tapes that Mr. Barker provided 
for which Mr. Yardley was terminated as a consequence thereof. Thus, Mr. Ogilvie 
provided testimony that identified issues and areas, at a minimum, that needed to be 
investigated that were never done in his viewing of the video tape with Mr. Gallegos. 
The Attorney General's Office did do an investigation. However, Diana Hollis, 
the investigator from the Attorney General's Office, testified that she was only assigned 
to and started her investigation on June 14,2001, the same day the Department notified 
Mr. Yardley of their intent to terminate his employment. (RT. 299:25). Mr. Ogilvie did 
note that the Department uses a slightly different procedure when the referral suggests 
criminal conduct on the part of an employee. (RT. 299:121-122). In those cases, the 
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Department would suspend their investigation and allow the criminal investigation to be 
completed first before conducting their own investigation. (RT. 299:121-122). However, 
Mr. Ogilvie ultimately acknowledged that the fact that no investigation was completed by 
the Department prior to notifying Mr. Yardley of their intent to terminate his employment 
was remarkable and unique in his experience. (RT. 299:125). As Mr. Ogilvie testified: "I 
don't know how that could have been done." (RT. 299:125). 
The CSRB's decision that the Department "began and ended" its investigation 
when Mr. Ogilvie and Mr. Gallegos viewed the video tape is not rational. Mr. Ogilvie 
testified that he did not conduct any investigation at that point and that he was ordered to 
discontinue his investigation. Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Ogilvie received information 
from the referral that identified areas that needed investigation, but were not investigated, 
substantively undermines the CSRB's decision. Indeed, if the investigation was 
completed, this case may not even exist since one of the principal issue raised in this case 
was an area that merited investigation - whether the referral was based upon the same 
conduct for which Mr. Yardley was previously disciplined. Ultimately, the Department 
was required by law to conduct an investigation. It implicitly requires a meaningful 
investigation. Otherwise, any fundamental requirement of due process would be satisfied 
with the employer simply concluding it was done, as occurred in this case, rendering the 
requirement meaningless. 
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THE DEPARTMENT FAILED TO ACT CONSISTENTLY IN 
TERMINATING MR, YARDLEYS EMPLOYMENT. 
In raising the issue of consistency of discipline, Mr. Yardley does not challenge 
whether the Department satisfied its initial burden of providing a factual basis for the 
allegations and whether the discipline was proportionate. Rather, Mr. Yardley contends 
that he presented sufficient evidence that the Department acted inconsistently in 
terminating his employment and therefore violated his due process rights. Mr. Yardley 
relies upon the case of Lunnen v. Utah Department of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70 (Utah 
App. 1994), where this Court held that once the employer satisfies its burden of providing 
factual support and establishing proportionality of the discipline, the employee must raise 
due process concerns, including consistency of discipline. 
Similar to the issue Lunnen, the Department maintains a policy that requires it to 
consider the consistency of the discipline it imposes. Under Department policy AE 
03/02.06, the Department, among other issues, is supposed to consider the "consistent 
application of rules and standard." (R. 66, Addendum A). Thus, like the employer in 
Lunnen, the Department was obligated to follow that policy. Following the presentation 
of the Department's case at the hearing, Mr. Yardley called several witnesses who offered 
evidence demonstrating that the Department has not acted consistently when it was aware 
of misconduct involving other employees where the same concerns raised over his 
conduct were present. 
30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
According to the Final Order terminating Mr. Yardley's employment, it maintained 
that the alleged misconduct he engaged in not only raised concerns for the Department 
about public perception, but also "negatively affected the workplace." (R. 367). The 
Department based the concern upon the allegation that Mr. Yardley engaged in 
inappropriate sexual acts using the name of a co-worker where the Department contended 
that it caused "rumors" of a workplace affair and "strained her marriage." (R. 367). 
Those concerns served as the basis for Mr. Yardley's termination. (RT. 322:118-119). 
Yet the evidence that Mr. Yardley presented clearly showed that many rumors circulated 
among Department employees that others, specifically two witnesses in this case, Lauren 
Barker and Annabelle Brough, were also rumored to have affairs with co-workers. In 
fact, Early Hobby, a former warden, testified that Ms. Brough's husband, Steve Brough, 
complained to him that he believes that his wife was having an affair with a co-worker. 
(RT. 303:44-45). The alleged co-worker, Randy Gerrard, also testified and 
acknowledged that he was aware of the many rumors that he was having an affair with 
Ms. Brough and that administration was aware of the rumors. (RT. 303:32-33, 35-36; 45-
46). However, to even Mr. Gerrard's surprise, no investigation was ever conducted 
regarding the rumors despite the fact that the substance of the rumors violated 
Department policy. (RT. 303:34). 
Beverly Thomas, a Deputy Warden, acknowledged that the Department initiates 
investigations from rumors of improprieties, and acknowledged, as did other 
administrators, that they were aware of Mr. Brough's complaint that his wife, Annabelle 
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Brough, was having an affair with a co-worker. (RT.303:17-20). Ms. Thomas had 
reported her concerns regarding Annabelle Brough to her supervisor, Bob Tanzy. (RT. 
302:20-26; 303:46). Department Administrators testified, as did Mr. Ogilvie, that the 
information regarding the affair warranted an investigation. (RT. 303:36-37; 299:146; 
322:120). According to the testimony, the Department's concern, as in Mr. Yardley's 
case, was not limited to the affair, but the effect on Mr. Brough's health and the 
employment environment. (RT. 302:20). The fact that Mr. Gerrard was Ms. Brough's 
subordinate was also of concern. (RT. 302: 22-25). Despite the Department's policy of 
investigating such "rumors," the Department failed to conduct any investigation into the 
rumored affair between Ms. Brough and Mr. Gerrard. The contrary seems to be the case. 
While no investigation was ever initiated, both parties, particularly Ms. Brough, have 
enjoyed significant employment advancement with the Department. (RT. 302:26-28). 
Thus, the evidence Mr. Yardley presented established that the concerns the Department 
identified with his conduct were similar to the concerns the Department raised with the 
conduct of other employees. Yet, the Department failed to even investigation the conduct 
of the other employees while they terminated his employment. 
Ultimately to prevail in this argument, Mr. Yardley must present evidence of 
"meaningful disparate" treatment based upon comparison of his case to "similar factual 
circumstances." Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission, 8 P.3d 1048,1056 
(Utah App. 2000). Mr. Yardley concedes that the evidence presented concerning the 
conduct of other parties was dissimilar to the conduct for which he was terminated. 
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However, conduct that is the subject of discipline is ultimately subject to discipline due to 
the concerns the conduct raises. Similarities in the concerns reasonably comport with the 
requirement that comparisons be made between "similar factual circumstances." In that 
regard, the concerns raised in Mr. Yardley's case over his conduct for which the 
Department terminated his employment were the same as those concerns raised and 
would be raised from the conduct of other Department employees Mr. Yardley introduced 
at the hearing. The similarities cover violations of Department policy to criminal 
violations to undermining Department integrity to causing rumors of workplace affairs to 
straining marriages to the negative impact upon the workplace. Thus, although in the 
conduct of other employees may be dissimilar to Mr. Yardley's conduct, the factual 
similarities in the concerns raised by the Department are not only similar, but the same. 
The evidence presented at the hearing by Mr. Yardley clearly established that the 
Department seemingly does not even so much as investigate the conduct of other 
employees who engaged in behavior that caused the Department the same concerns as it 
had with Mr. Yardley. By terminating Mr. Yardley's employment while allowing the 
other employees to continue employment, the Department has acted impermissibly 
inconsistent in violation of the Mr. Yardley's due process rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The conduct for which Mr. Yardley was terminated is offensive and disturbing. 
However, regardless of how offensive Mr. Yardley's conduct may be, the rule of law 
must be preserved and must prevail. As a matter of law, the Department must act in 
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accordance with the terms of the warning that they previously issued to Mr. Yardley that 
warned him that they would consider terminating his employment if he committed the 
same type of conduct in the future. Mr. Yardley took the warning to heart, did not 
commit any further acts of misconduct and he was successfully completing his 
performance plan. The Department's subsequent termination of his employment for the 
same type of conduct for which he was previously disciplined that without dispute 
occurred not after the warning was issued, but well before it, violates the terms of the 
warning. Furthermore, the Department violated Mr. Yardley's right to due process and 
caused him material harm by disregarding its procedures without justification in 
terminating his employment Finally, the evidence demonstrates that the Department does 
not act consistently in disciplining employees when Mr. Yardley's case is compared 
against similar cases. Consequently, the CSRB's decision affirming the Department's 
termination of Mr. Yardley was not reasonable nor rational. Accordingly, the CSRB's 
decision should be reversed, Mr. Yardley's employment should be reinstated and he 
should be awarded back pay. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 22nd day of June, 2005. 
Make Nakamura 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, BLAKE A. NAKAMURA, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-
delivered V^ copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State 
Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and ^ e o p i e s to the Utah Attorney 
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 22nd da^ of June 2005. 
Delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney Genera's Office as 
set forth above, this 'ffl> day of June 2005. 
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1. transfers; 
2. additional training; 
3. reassignments; and 
4. corrective action. 
C. Nothing in this section shall preclude the division director from taking 
corrective action, transferring, reassigning and providing additional training as 
managerial tools. 
AE 03/02,06 Procedures: Factors to be Considered in Determining Discipline 
A. When deciding the specific type and severity of the discipline to 
administer to any employee, the following may be considered: 
1. consistent application of rules and standards; 
2. prior knowledge of rules and standards; 
3. the severity of the infraction; 
4. the repeated nature of violations; 
5. prior disciplinary/corrective actions; 
6. previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions; 
7. the employee's past work record; 
8. the potential effect on agency operations, the Department's ability 
to carry out its duties, or public confidence in the member and/or Department; and 
9. the potential of the violations for causing damage to persons or 
property. 
B. At the time the disciplinary action is imposed, the employee shall be 
notified in writing of the discipline, the reasons for the discipline, the effective 
date and length of the discipline. 
C. Final decisions in disciplinary actions are subject to the grievance and 
appeals procedure as provided by law for career service employees only. 
AE 03/02,07 Procedure: Probationary, Exempt and Career Status Members 
A. All members, regardless of employment status, are subject to AE 02, 
"Code of Conduct". 
B. Members who are on probationary or exempt status do not have a property 
interest in their jobs and, therefore, do not have a right to due process before the 
Revised 12/1/93 AA 01/01.00 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
KEVIN YARDLEY, : 
: DECISION 
Grievant and Appellant, : AND 
: FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
v, : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, : 
Agency and Respondent. : Case No- 8 CSRB 77 (Step 6) 
On Tuesday, April 20,2004, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) held an 
appellate review hearing in the above-entitled case involving all the parties and an executive session. 
The following Board Members were present and heard oral argument at the hearing and deliberated 
in an executive session: Felix J. McGowan, Acting Chair; Joan M. Gallegos and Kevin C. Timken, 
Board Members. At the hearing, Kevin Yardley (Appellant) was present and represented by 
Blake Nakamura, Attorney at Law, who presented oral argument on Appellant's behalf. Assistant 
Attorney General Robert E. Steed represented the Utah Department of Corrections (Department and 
UDC) and presented oral argument on the Department's behalf.1 Accompanying Mr, Steed as the 
Department Representative was Lori Worthington, Correctional Program Coordinator. 
AUTHORITY 
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code at §§67-19a-101 through -408 
of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, which is a sub-part of the Utah State 
Personnel Management Act at §§67-19-1 etseq. The CSRB's administrative rules are published in the 
Utah Admin. Code at R137-1-1 through -23. This Board-level or Step 6 appeal hearing is the final 
administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for Mr. Yardley's 
appeal from termination of his employment Both the Board's evidentiary/Step 5 and these 
1Assistant Attorney QeneralPatrickB.Nolan represented theDepartmentattheStepS/evidentiary hearing 
in this matter „ However, after Appellant appealed the hearing officer's decision and order, Assistant Attorney 
GeneralRobertE-Steedappeai^ and represented the Dq This representation included 
filing a Reply Brief to Grievant's Step 6 appeal and oral argument atthe administrative hearing held before the 
Board. 
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appellate/Step 6 proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to R137-l-18(2)(a). 
Therefore, those provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) pertaining to formal 
adjudications are applicable to the CSRB's Step 5 and Step 6 hearings. (§§63-46b-0.5 et seq.) 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On June 14,2001, Appellant was given initial notice of the Department's intent to terminate 
(Initial Notice of Intent) Appellant's employment as a Correctional Security Officer for the 
Department (Ex. A-10; Appellant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Summary 
Judgment dated March 27, 2002; Attachment C)2 This Initial Notice of Intent was issued by 
Scott Carver who at the time was the Division Director of the Department's Division of Institutional 
Operations (DIO).3 The Department's Initial Notice of Intent appropriately informed Appellant of his 
right to appeal the Agency's Intent to then Executive Director Mike Chabries (Exec. Dir. Chabries). 
{Id.) At the time the Initial Notice of Intent was issued, Appellant had been employed as with the 
Department for more than ten and one-half years. (Id.) 
This June 14, 2001 Initial Notice of Intent recommended that Appellant's employment be 
terminated for multiple violations of State and Department policies and procedures. Specifically, the 
Department alleged that Appellant violated UDC Policies AE 02\11.03 Professionalism, AE02\05.00 
Dereliction of Duty and Utah Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) rule R477-9 
Employee Conduct by videotaping himself "performing various sexual acts while on duty." (Id.) As 
mandated by DHRM rule R477-11-1(2)\ Appellant appropriately filed a reply (Initial Reply) to the 
Department's Initial Notice of Intent on June 21,2001.s {Id.) 
appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment andaccompanyingMemorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support thereof are part of the file maintained and controlled by the CSRB office. 
3Scott Carver is currently serving as the "Acting Executive Director" for the Department. 
4DHRM rule R477-11-2(2) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(2) No employee shall be dismissed or demoted from a career service 
position unless . . . 
(a) The agency head or designee shall notify the employee in 
writing of the specific reasons forthe proposed dismissal or 
demotion. 
(b) The employee shall have up to five working days to reply.... 
5Mr. Blake Nakamura filed an appearance of counsel as well as the InitialReply with the Department on 
June 21,2001. (Ex. A-10) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Dec 23 04 01:59p Career service Keview oa I O U U ^oo oio^ » r * ~* 
In his Initial Reply, Appellant argued that the Department's Initial Notice of Intent was 
deficient because it lacked sufficient specificity and referenced conduct for which Appellant had 
previously been disciplined. (Ex. A-10.)6 AfterreviewingAppellant'sInitialReply5theDepartment's 
administrative law judge (ALT) issued an order dated June 29,2001, specifically finding that: 
[T]he notice provided to Mr. Yardley (Appellant) does not provide 
adequate notice as to what conduct serves as the basis for discipline. 
It does not allow Mr. Yardley (Appellant) to determine if the videotape 
serving as the basis for the current case is the same as the one serving 
as the basis for 2001 MC 17-D.7 
(Appellant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, Attachment D) 
As a result of these findings, the Department's ALJ ordered that the disciplinary proceedings 
against Appellant be stayed and that the Department provide Appellant an amended notice of intent 
with sufficient infonnation to allow him to respond and specifically determine whether the 
Department's Intent to Terminate Appellant was based on conduct for which he previously had been 
disciplined. The Department's ALJ ordered that this amended intent provide, insofar as possible, 
specific dates, times and places regarding when and where Appellant's misconduct occurred. (Id.) 
On July 9, 2001, Appellant received an Amended Notice of Intent to Terminate his 
employment with the Department (Amended Notice of Intent). (Exs. A-9, A-10) This Amended 
Notice of Intent was also issued by Scott Carver and, in accordance with the ALJ's Order dated 
June 29,2001, listed in specific and graphic detail the dates, times and places Appellant was allegpd 
to have engaged in conduct violating Department and State policy. (Id.) 
Specifically, the Department's Amended Notice of Intent alleged that on virtually countless 
occasions between the years 1999-2000, Appellant videotaped himself masturbating not only while 
on duty in the guard tower at CUCF, but in open public areas and at home. (Id.) The masturbation 
in the guard tower allegedly occurred while Appellant was out of uniform because he had removed 
6On March 5,2001, a few months prior to the Department's Initial Notice of Intent at issue in this case, 
Appellant was suspended from work for 15 working days. The basis for this suspension was that in 1995 and 
1998, Appellant videotaped himself and his wife engaged in sexual intercourse and was involved in disseminating 
these tapes to coworkers. The Department further found that on at least one occasion, Appellant masturbated 
while on duty in the Central Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF) guard tower. (Ex. A-8, A-10) 
72001 MC 17-D isthe disciplinary case number corresponding wMitheDepartment's 15-day suspension 
of Appellant for videotapinghimself engaged in sexual intercourse with his wife and for masturbating while on 
duty in the guard tower on at least one occasion, (Ex. A-8) 
Yardley v. Corrections, Case No. 8 CSRB 77 D„~~ *5 
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most of his clothing. (Id.) The Department further alleged the video depicted Appellant masturbating 
with the names of various women displayed on his penis including at least one instance where the 
name displayed on his penis was that of a coworker. (Id.) 
In addition, the Department alleged that on at least six separate occasions while videotaping 
himself masturbating, Appellant displayed a sign inviting calls from women. This sign, sometimes 
displayed around his neck, provided the phone numbers of both his home and the guard tower and 
invited calls to either location. (Id.) 
The Department's allegations also included that Appellant videotaped a woman walking 
through the CUCF parking area and on at least three occasions videotaped his neighbor working in her 
yard. (Id.) Finally, the Department's Amended Notice of Intent alleged conduct wherein Appellant 
videotaped himself masturbating either at home, work or other public places using various objects. 
The objects alleged to have been used by Appellant to masturbate with included, but were not limited 
to, a watermelon, a squash, a trash bag filled with grass clippings, a truck tailpipe and gas tank, demits, 
a flashlight, a green bottle, a public chainlink fence, a stuffed animal, a gas can, and a cherry pie. (Id.) 
In its Amended Notice of Intent, the Department alleged that Appellant's conduct as outlined 
above violated numerous Department and State workplace policies. Specifically, The Department 
alleged Appellant's conduct violated DHRM rule R477-9 Employee Conduct, UDC Policies 
AE 02\11.03(L), (M), (?) Professionalism, AE 02\05.00 Dereliction of Duty, AE 02\13.05 Bringing 
Unauthorized Items Into A Correctional Facility, ACr 30/04.05 Acceptable Use of Electronic 
Communication Technology, and FBr 13\09,15,16 governing dress and uniform standards* (Id,) In 
its Amended Notice of Intent, the Department further clarified that; "This intent to impose disciplinary 
action is based on events which occurred separate and apart from those events for which you were 
previously disciplined on March 5,2001." (Ex. A-9) 
After receiving the Department1 s AmendedNotice oflntent, Appellant filed a written response 
requesting a hearing before the Department imposed any disciplinary action. (Ex. A-10) OnAugust9, 
2001, a hearing was held before the Department's ALT regarding the Department's intent to terminate 
Appellant's employment (Id.) This hearing was held as part of the Department's internal grievance 
procedure and in consonance with the rules established by the CSRB and under the authority of Utah 
Code Ann. §64^13-28. 
At this evidentiary hearing, Appellant did not challenge the factual allegations set forth in the 
Department's AmendedNotice oflntent, nor that he videotaped himself engaging in such conduct 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(Ex. A-10 at 9) Instead, Appellant primarily argued that the entire case against him should be 
dismissed because he had previously been disciplined for the conduct depicted on the videotape that 
was now being relied upon by the Department to terminate his employment. (Id.) 
On September 12, 2001, the Department's AU entered his Report and Recommendation 
(R&R) wherein he recommended that Appellant's employment with the Department be terminated. 
(Exs. A-10atl2,A-ll,G-2)8 In reaching this decision, however, the Department's ALJ specifically 
agreed with Appellant that the evidence presented at the departmental hearing failed to establish that 
the conduct occurring in the guard tower and depicted in the video tape in the current case was 
distinguishable from the conduct occurring in the guard tower for which Appellant had previously been 
disciplined.9 (Ex. A-10) 
After addressing the evidence regarding Appellant's videotaped conduct in the tower while on 
duty, the Department's ALJ then shifted his focus to Appellant's conduct outside the CUCF tower. 
After reviewing this evidence, the Department's ALJ concluded: "There is sufficient, egregious 
misconduct occurring outside of the tower to warrant terminating Mr. Yardley's employment.... 
Additional overwhelming evidence exists that Mr. Yardley is manifestly unfit to remain an employee 
of the Department." (Id. at 11) In reaching this decision, the Department's AU focused on the very 
disturbing nature of Appellant's conduct outside the CUCF tower and his finding that some of 
Appellant's conduct violated criminal law. (Id.) 
After reviewing the Department ALJ's R&R, Exec. Dir. Chabries entered his Final Order 
terminating Appellant's employment with the Department (Ex. A-l 1) This Order was entered on 
November 5, 2001. (Id.) In reaching his decision to terminate Appellant's employment, Exec. 
Dir. Chabries adopted many of the findings and conclusions of the Department's ALJ. (Id.) However, 
contrary to the Department ALJ's findings, Exec. Dir, Chabries found that Appellant's conduct in the 
guard tower was also a basis for terminating him. {Id.) 
In reaching this decision, Exec. Dir. Chabries concluded that the videotaped conduct giving 
rise to the Department's Amended Notice of Intent to Terminate went beyond the simple masturbation 
for which Appellant had previously been disciplined. (Id,) In reaching this decision, 
*It appears fromEx.A-ll thatAppellantreceivedacopyofthisR&RonSeptember 18,2001. However, 
the ALJ signed and dated the R&R on September 12,2001. (Exs. A-10, A-ll) 
9See n.6 discussing Appellant's prior discipline for masturbating while on duty in the guard tower "cm at 
least one other occasion." 
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Exec. Dir. Chabries focused on facts present in this case that were never established in Appellant's 
prior disciplinary action. Some of the factors relied upon by Exec. Dir. Chabries to distinguish this 
case from Appellant's prior disciplinary action included Appellant's conduct of displaying women's 
names on his penis while masturbating in the guard tower and wearing a sign around his neck inviting 
women to call him while on duty in the CUCF guard tower. (Id.) 
In reaching his final decision, Exec. Dir. Chabries also found that Appellant's conduct outside 
the tower was sufficient in and of itself to warrant termination of Appellant's employment. In reaching 
this decision, Exec. Dir. Chabries emphasized that Appellant engaged in sexual conduct in public 
places in violation of criminal law and departmental policy. Exec. Dir. Chabries found Appellant's 
conduct discredited the Department and had an adverse impact on the efficiency of the Department. 
(Id.) 
Based upon his findings, Exec. Dir. Chabries ordered Appellant's employment with the 
Department to be terminated. (Id.) Thereafter, on November 20, 2001, Appellant timely filed an 
appeal of Exec. Dir. Chabries' Final Order with the CSRB, 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
In addressing the proceedings before the CSRB, the Board notes that before the evidentiary 
hearing was held in this matter, both parties filed motions for and memorandums in support of 
summary judgment. Appellant filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on March 28, 2002. On 
May 15, 2002, the Department filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment and a memorandum 
simultaneously in support of its motion and in opposition to Appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Both parties then filed appropriate responses and replies to the cross-motions for summary 
judgment.10 
In moving for summary judgment, Appellant conceded that there was no dispute as to the 
material facts at issue in this case, but that the Department's termination of his employment was 
"unlawful and wrongful" because it violated a prior contractual agreement (Appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment) In arguing that his termination was "unlawful and wrongful," Appellant relied 
on the language set forth in the Administrative Complaint that ultimately resulted in Appellant5 s prior 
15 working day suspension for videotaping himself and his wife engaged in sexual intercourse and for 
10As stated in n.2 above, these motions for summary judgement and the accompanying memoranda in 
support, responses and replies are part of the file maintained and controlled by the CSRB Office. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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masturbating while on duty in the guard tower on at least one occasion. (Appellant's Memorandum 
in Support of Summary Judgment)11 
The specific wording in the Administrative Complaint relied upon by Appellant in making this 
argument provides as follows: "You are hereby warned that should this kind of misconduct reoccur 
in the future we will be forced to consider severe disciplinary sanctions, including termination." (itf.at 
7-8, Ex. A-7) (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant argued on summary judgment that because the "conduct" for which the Department 
now seeks to terminate his employment occurred prior to the date of this warning and involved the 
same type of misconduct, that conduct cannot now be used in further disciplinary proceedings. (Id.) 
Essentially, Appellant argued that because he did not engage "in any misconduct after his initial 
discipline, the Agency's Final Order terminating Mr. Yardley's [Appellant's] employment on 
November 5, 2001, violates the contractual agreement that it [Department] had with Mr. Yardley 
[Appellant] from his prior discipline.'* (Appellant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment 
at 5) 
In its cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition, the Department essentially argued 
that Appellant's reliance on a "single sentence" is misplaced and taken largely out of context The 
Department further argued that because Appellant is a career service employee, he is subject only to 
the terms and granted only the protections specifically set forth in the Utah State Personnel 
Management Act at Utah Code Ann, § 67-19-1 et seq. These protections, the Department argued, 
control and govern dismissals of career service employees. 
After considering the parties' motions and the memoranda both in support and opposition, the 
Hearing Officer entered his order dated June 28,2002. In his written decision, the Hearing Officer 
specifically denied Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the Department's motion 
that Appellant's rights were governed by statute rather than contract. (Hearing Officer Order dated 
June 28,2002)12 The Hearing Officer specifically found that "Grievant [Appellant] is a career service 
"Appellant was served this Administrative Complaint on January 12,2001. The specific allegation was: 
M[I]n 1995 and again in 1998 you videotaped yourself and your wife engaged in sexual intercourse. These tapes 
were somehow circulated to some CUCF staff members. It is further alleged thatyou, on at least one occasion, 
masturbatedwhileondutyinthetower. Both ofthese allegations you admitted to participating in. ..." Appellant 
never contested these allegations. As stated previously, the Department entered itsFinal Order regarding these 
allegations on March 5,2001. 
l2This Order is part of the file maintained and controlled by the CSRB Office. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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employee. Accordingly, he is a statutory employee rather than a contract employee. His rights in 
matters of discipline are set forth in statute, specifically in Utah Personnel Management Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 67-19-1 et seq. His rights in matters of discipline are not set forth in contract... the 
language in the Administrative Complaint does not rise to the level of a legally binding contract 
between Grievant and the Agency." (Id, at 2) 
Thereafter, on July 11, 2002, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Hearing 
Officer's Order date June 28,2002,13 The Agency filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's 
Motion to Reconsider on July 29,2002. On August 7,2002, the Hearing Officer entered his decision 
denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
On April 2,3,4, and 23,2003, an evidentiary hearing was held before CSRB Hearing Officer 
J, Francis Valerga, At this hearing, Appellant was represented by Blake Nakamura, Attorney at Law. 
The Department was represented by Assistant Attorney General Patrick B. Nolan, who was assisted 
by Department Management Representative David Salazar, Human Resource Director for the 
Department. 
The statute authorizing the CSRB to hold an evidentiary hearing can be found at Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19a-4G6. Moreover, because Appellant's employment was terminated, the Department had 
the burden of proving its case by substantial evidence and the burden of going forward. (Utah Code 
Ann § 67-19a~406(2)(a) and (c)) 
The specific issues adjudicated at the Step 5 hearing were twofold. First, did the Department 
terminate Appellant's employment for just cause or for the good of the public service as required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1)? Second, if the Department did not terminate Appellant's employment 
for these reasons, what is the appropriate remedy? (Prehearing Conference Summary and Order f 3 
at 1; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision at 1) 
At the evidentiary hearing on this matter, the Hearing Officer received evidence relating to the 
several allegations against Appellant. This evidence included testimony given and documents 
received concerning Appellant's alleged conduct of videotaping himself masturbating, not only while 
on duty in the guard tower at CUCF, but in open public areas and at home. The evidentiary hearing 
also included extensive evidence regarding the internal procedures followed by the Department in 
l3Though not specifically cited, the Board assumes this Motion for Reconsideration was filed pursuant 
to Utah Admin. Code R137-l-21(12). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 3 0 4 0 2 : 0 1 p c ? r e e r s e r v i c e rcevieu* o a l o i - i j o o o OAOO 
reaching its decision to terminate Appellant's employment and whether those procedures afforded 
Appellant appropriate due process protections. 
Specifically, testimony was given and documentary evidence received at the evidentiary 
hearing relating to the Department5 s allegations that Appellant masturbated on numerous occasions 
and sometimes using objects, while on duty in the guard tower at CUCF, in open public areas and 
at home. There was also evidence received concerning the Department's allegations that this 
conduct occurred while Appellant was out of uniform and with the names of various women 
displayed on his penis, including at least one instance where the name displayed on his penis was 
that of a coworker. Evidence was also received relating to other alleged violations by Appellant of 
Department policy including allegations that Appellant videotaped himself masturbating in the guard 
tower with a sign displayed around his neck inviting calls from women. This sign provided phone 
numbers of both his home and the guard tower and invited calls to either location. 
In addition, extensive testimony was given and documentary evidence received concerning 
Appellant's due process concerns. Specifically, evidence was received examining whether the 
alleged conduct at issue in the instant case involved conduct for which Appellant had previously 
been disciplined and whether the Department acted consistently in terminating Appellant's 
employment. Finally, evidence was received regarding the administrative and investigative process 
initiated by the Department in reaching its final decision to dismiss Appellant. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer entered his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision (Step 5 Decision) dated August 21,2003. In this Step 5 Decision, 
the Hearing Officer examined the evidence presented at the hearing and concluded there was 
substantial evidence to support the Department's decision to terminate Appellant's employment and 
that such discipline was consistent, for just cause and advanced the good of the public service. 
(Step 5 Decision at 4) 
Moreover, the Hearing Officer specifically found that the conduct for which Appellant was 
dismissed was separate and apart from the conduct for which he was previously disciplined and that 
the internal procedures followed by the Department during the termination process complied with 
all relevant policies, rules and statutes. (Id. at 4-5) 
Finally, the Hearing Officer concluded that the warning language contained in the January 12, 
2001 Administrative Complaint did not create a binding agreement or promise upon which Grievant 
[Appellant] could rely "to prevent termination of his employment" (Id. at 9) Based upon this Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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conclusion, the Hearing Officer held that the Department did not violate any prior agreement by 
terminating Appellant's employment. (Id. at 9-10) 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
L ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In Appellant's appeal before this Board, he challenges numerous aspects of the Hearing 
Officer's Step 5 Decision. Specifically, Appellant challenges the Hearing Officer's conclusion that 
the warning language contained in the January 12,2001 Administrative Complaint did not create a 
promise or binding agreement upon which Appellant could rely to prevent termination of his 
employment. Addressing this issue in bis Step 6 appeal before the Board, Appellant summarized 
as follows: 
[Tjn terminating Mr. Yardley for conduct that pre dated [sic] his prior 
discipline, the Agency violated a prior warning issued to Mr. Yardley 
pursuant to its own policy and that the Step 5 Decision reasoning that 
such deviation is lawful is not supported by the law. 
(Grievant's Step 6 Brief on Appeal) 
Appellant also argues that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the discipline 
Appellant received was consistent with how the Department has treated other employees who have 
engaged in similar conduct Citing to Lunnen v. Utah Dep V of Transportation, 886 P.2d. 70 (Ut 
App. Ct. 1994), Appellant argues that this alleged inconsistency violates due process thereby 
requiring that the Department's disciplinary sanction of dismissal be overturned. (Id. at 24-25) 
Finally, Appellant challenges the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the internal procedures 
followed by the Department during the termination process'afforded Appellant appropriate due 
process protections and substantively complied with all relevant policies, procedures and statutes. 
(Id. at 1046) Appellant argues that the Department violated his due process rights during the 
termination process by not conducting an investigation prior to terminating his employment and for 
disregarding its own internal practice of utilizing committee reviews prior to imposing discipline. 
(Id, at 2-3,11) 
In essence, Appellant challenges the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision on two primary 
grounds. First, Appellant asserts that the Department's termination of his employment violated 
alleged contractual language set forth in a prior Administrative Complaint stating that "should this 
type of misconduct reoccur in the future we will be forced to consider severe disciplinary sanctions, 
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including termination." Second, Appellant raises due process concerns related to consistency and 
failure by the Department to follow internal procedures during the termination process. These issues 
will be now addressed in the remainder of this Decision and Final Agency Action. 
IL THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We review Appellant's appeal under Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(a) through 
(c), (Supp. 2003), which reads as follows: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according 
to the substantial evidence standard. When the board determines that the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational 
based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in 
its discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional 
factual findings. 
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the 
factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the 
board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance with the 
correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the 
evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB 
hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the 
agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings 
and correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined 
according to the above provisions. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's 
factual findings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and 
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact 
finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied 'the relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing Officer 
on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the totality of the 
Department's disciplinary penalty of termination of Appellant's employment is reasonable and 
rational based upon our determination of the ultimate facts together with the correct application of 
relevant State policies, rules and statutes which were considered by our Hearing Officer. 
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BOARD'S REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT'S PRIOR DISCIPLINE OF APPELLANT 
AND IT'S WARNING REGARDING FUTURE MISCONDUCT 
AS set forth above, on March 5,2001, Appellant was suspended from his employment for 
15 working days. (Ex. A-8)14 The Department imposed this suspension after Appellant failed to 
contestthe Department's allegations that "[I]n 1995 and again in 1998 you videotaped yourself and 
your wife engaged in sexual intercourse. These tapes were somehow circulated to some CUCF staff 
members. It is further alleged that you, on at least one occasion, masturbated while on duty in the 
tower...." (Ex.A-7) 
The Administrative Complaint setting forth these allegations was dated January 12,200 L 
(Id.) This Administrative Complaint also specifically provided that, "y°u a r e hereby warned that 
should this type of misconduct reoccur in the future, we will be forced to consider severe disciplinary 
sanctions, including termination/1' (Id) 
On appeal, Appellant argues that the Department's termination of his employment violates 
the warning language set forth in this January 12,2001 Administrative Complaint In making this 
argument, both at the evidentiary hearing and on appeal before this Board, Appellant relies primarily 
on two factors. First, Appellant correctly asserts that the conduct relied upon by the Department in 
making its decision to terminate his employment occurred before this January 12, 2001 
Administrative Complaint (Grievant's Step 6 Brief on Appeal at 17-18)15 Second, Appellant asserts 
the conduct for which he was terminated was of the same type for which he was previously 
disciplined. (Id.) (Emphasis added) Based upon these two factors, Appellant argues that the 
Department5 s termination of his employment violated due process by breaching the terms of his prior 
Administrative Complaint and that the Hearing Officer's Decision is "not supported by the law." 
(Id. at 3,17) 
l4TheBoard briefly addressed these facts onpage3 and footnotes 6 & 7 ofthis Decision and Final Agency 
Action. 
l5TheHearingOfl5cer specifically found, and this Board agrees, that "die conduct on the second videotape 
occurred before January 12,200 L" (Step 5 Decision at 10) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Specifically addressing this issue in his brief before this Board, Appellant asserts that 
"whether the agency acted properly in terminating Mr, Yardley' s employment in light of the warning 
depends on whether the conduct for which they terminated him was of the same 'type' of conduct 
for which Mr. Yardley was previously disciplined and if so, whether Mr. Yardley can assert and 
enforce the terms of the warning against the agency/5 (Id) In light of this argument, the Board will 
first address whether the evidence establishes that the conduct the Department relied upon to 
terminate Appellant's employment is of the same "type" for which they had previously suspended 
him. 
In arguing that the conduct for which Appellant was dismissed was the same "type" of 
conduct for which he had previously been suspended, Appellant relies primarily upon the testimony 
of two witnesses - Beverly Thomas and Gary Ogilvie. (Id. at 18)i6 In his written appeal, Appellant 
argues that both Ms. Thomas and Mr. Ogilvie knew of the underlying conduct leading to Appellant's 
suspension and the underlying conduct relied upon by the Department to terminate Appellant's 
employment and that "both agreed that the conduct in the two instances were of the same type." (Id) 
In support of this argument, Appellant specifically cites to the evidentiary transcript wherein 
Mr. Ogilvie testified on cross-examination as follows: 
MR. NAKAMURA: Q. That's - you understand the current stuff has 
videotapes of masturbation, sexual intercourse on it? 
A. I understand that. Yes. 
Q. And that's exactly what the concern was in the videotapes in the prior 
discipline, masturbation and sexual intercourse? 
A. That's correct 
Q. Same type, different dates, though, right? 
A. Different dates. 
(April 2,2003 Tr. at 108-109) 
Ms. Thomas testified that: 
16Gary Ogilvie was the Department's Internal Affairs Investigator who investigated the allegations that 
resulted in Appellant's suspension from woik for I5days. Beverly Thomas was the Deputy Warden at CUCF both 
at the time Appellant was suspended 15 working days and when he was dismissed. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Q. [B]ased upon what you know of the prior investigation and now what you know 
of the current matter, do you believe the current matter is based upon the some [sic] 
kind of conduct and information that was involved in the first discipline? 
A. I do. 
(April 3,2003 Tr. at 47) 
In response to this argument, the Department asserts that Appellant has taken this testimony 
largely out of context and mischaracterized it as an admission by the Department that the conduct 
involved in both the suspension and termination were of the "same type." (Agency's Reply Brief 
at 15) After review of the evidentiary record as a whole, including careful review of Ms. Thomas' 
and Mr. Ogilvie's sworn testimony, the Board agrees with the Department that Appellant's 
substantial reliance on this testimony is misplaced. While this Board agrees that in a very general 
sense the evidentiary record shows that the conduct investigated, established and relied upon by the 
Department in both disciplinary proceedings involved videotapes of masturbation and sexual 
intercourse, it also finds that is where the similarities end. 
The evidentiary record in the instant case clearly establishes that at no time during the 
investigation that resulted in Appellant's 15-day suspension did the Department become aware of 
or rely on the fact that Appellant had videotaped himself masturbating with the names of various 
women displayed on his penis, including in at least one instance where the name displayed on his 
penis was that of a coworker. (April 2,2003 Tr. at 77) 
In addition, the record establishes that at the time the Department suspended Appellant for 
15 working days, it was not aware that Appellant removed his clothing to masturbate while on duty 
nor that on at least six separate occasions while videotaping himself masturbating, Appellant had 
displayed a sign around his neck inviting women to call him either at home or while on duty at the 
CUCF tower. (Id. at 104-105; April 3,2003 Tr. at 145; April 23,2003 Tr. at 75-76; Ex. A-9) 
Finally, it is also clear that at the time the Department imposed its 15 working day suspension 
on Appellant, it was unaware that Appellant had videotaped himself masturbating in public areas in 
possible violation of Utah law. (April 2,2003 Tr. at 105; April 23,2003 Tr. at 92; Exs. A-9, A-10) 
It is also evident from the evidentiary record that at the time of Appellant's suspension, the 
Department was unaware that in videotaping himself masturbating either at home, work or other 
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public places, Appellant used a large array of inanimate objects with which to masturbate. (April 2, 
2003 Tr. at 104-105; April 3,2003 Tr. at 146; April 23, 2003 Tr. 105,109) 
Careful review of the evidentiary record, including those portions cited above, 
overwhelmingly supports the Department's position that this information was not known by the 
Department until after Appellant's suspension. Moreover, the record establishes that the conduct 
relied upon to terminate Appellant* s employment was different from and more serious from a public 
safety standpoint, than the simple videotaped masturbation that was the subject of Appellant's 
15-day suspension. (Id.) 
Specifically comparing the conduct relied upon by the Department to terminate Appellant's 
employment with the conduct that was the basis of Appellant's previous 15-day suspension, 
Mr. Ogilvie testified as follows: 
A. The content of what was depicted was different. The only thing I knew about 
from the earlier investigation was that there was intercourse between himself and 
his wife. 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. And there was none of that in this new tape. 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. I knew he had masturbation on the tower. 
Q. Uh-Huh. 
A. But I didn't know anything about the other things he was doing in the tower. I 
didn't know anything about all of the things that he was doing at home and 
elsewhere. 
Q. Okay. And so when you say doing all the things in the tower and elsewhere, 
what we're talking about is masturbating, masturbation in the home? 
A. Not just masturbating. 
Q. What else? 
A. Masturbation was included. Oh, there was signs around his neck and there was 
things written on his penis, there were objects involved, viewing pornography on 
the television, it looked like, or computer, perhaps. 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. And there was also magazines that he was looking at. 
YnrriJwv Cnrraffirmv Cwnldry Q PODD nn 
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Q. Okay. 
A, None of those things were part of the first investigation. 
(April 3 Tr. at 104-105) 
In addition, careful examination of the transcript establishes that the internal investigation 
that ultimately resulted in Appellant's 15-day suspension was initiated after the Department's 
Investigative Bureau received a request for an investigation from the CUCF Warden. (April 2,2003 
Tr* 67-69) Testifying about this referral, Mr. Ogilvie stated that the request for investigation was 
based upon the fact: 
[T]here were rumor and talk of that involving Officer Kevin Yardley and his 
wife. That that rumor was that the video had now surfaced and that it 
included additional clips that included not only Mr. Yardley and his wife, but 
included Mr. Yardley masturbating in the tower, and some video shots of 
staff members walking in the - in the CUCF area there. 
(April 2,2003 Tr. 68) 
The evidentiary record also establishes that the Department's internal investigation that 
resuItedinAppellant's 15 working day suspension was initiated because CUCF administrators heard 
that videotapes depicting Appellant were being circulated to some CUCF staff members. (Ex. A-7) 
One staff member who spoke with CUCF administrators regarding the videotapes was Officer 
Travis Clark. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Clark testified that in explaining to CUCF staff what he had 
seen on the tapes, he told them: "[H]e [Appellant] was masturbating on them and some - you know, 
I didn't like go into detail about how, but I told them about some of the images that were on there." 
(April 23,2003 Tr. at 12) 
Specifically testifying as to whether he informed CUCF staff during the initial investigation 
that the videotapes he had viewed depicted Appellant masturbating with various objects while at 
home, work or other public places, Mr. Clark testified as follows: 
A. I don't know. I can't say for sure if these were before or after that point 
because, if I remember right, I received some of them even after thai point 
I can't remember. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Maybe I did. I'm not sure at that point how many I had received. 
(April 23,2003 Tr. at 13) 
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Based upon our thorough review of the evidentiary record and careful consideration of the 
parties' briefs on appeal, this Board believes there is more than substantial evidence to support the 
Hearing Officer's finding that the troubling conduct relied upon by the Department in making its 
decision to terminate Appellant's employment was not only substantively unknown to the 
Department at the time it suspended Appellant, but was categorically different from the conduct 
relied upon to suspend him. 
Though it is true that videotaped masturbation was a concern in both disciplinary actions, it 
is an unfair characterization of the facts of this case to argue Appellant was dismissed for the "same 
type*' of conduct for which he had previously been suspended. The facts distinguishing this case 
from Appellant's prior suspension are simultaneously glaring and disturbing. The distinguishing 
facts of this case include masturbation by Appellant in open public areas, names of women depicted 
on his penis as he masturbates, being out of uniform while masturbating in the tower and using signs 
to invite calls from women requesting him to masturbate for them while on duty. 
The troubling nature of the conduct relied upon by the Department to terminate Appellant's 
empl oyment was not only unknown to the Department at the time Appellant was suspended, but was 
categorically different and more concerning from a public safety standpoint than the simple 
videotaped masturbation and sexual intercourse that were the cause for Appellant's prior 15-day 
suspension. Based upon these factors, this Board upholds the Hearing Officer's decision regarding 
this issue. 
Because this Board finds that the misconduct for which Appellant was terminated from his 
employment with the Department is not the "same type" of misconduct for which Appellant was 
suspended, this Board finds that the warning language set forth in the January 12, 2001 
Administrative Complaint provides Appellant no protection. However, because of the facts of this 
case, the Board will briefly address Appellant's argument that the warning language provided him 
protection from iurther discipline. 
The undisputed facts of the instant case establish that on March 5, 2001, Appellant was 
suspended from his employment for videotaping himself and his wife engaged in sexual intercourse 
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and for masturbating while on duty in the tower on at least one occasion. (Exs. A-7, A-8)17 Prior 
to this suspension, an investigation was conducted by Department Internal Investigator Gary Ogilvie. 
Mr. Ogilvie interviewed Appellant as part of this initial investigation. At no time during this 
interview or indeed, during the imtial investigative process, did Appellant ever give Mr. Ogilvie a 
clear picture of the conduct in which Appellant was involved nor did Appellant ever fully disclose 
what was depicted on the videotapes. (April 3,2003 Tr. at 151-152,157, April 23,2003 Tr. at 56; 
Ex. G-l) 
Based upon these facts, this Board finds that the warning in the instant case was simply an 
attempt by the Departmentto express its expectation concerning Appellant's future behavior and was 
given based upon the limited information provided by Appellant. This language in no way excuses 
Appellant's conduct nor does it provide immumty for actions and violations substantively unknown 
and categorically different from the conduct relied upon to impose the suspension. 
Indeed, this Board agrees with the Department's argument that to rule otherwise would 
"encourage employees to withhold information from their employer during their investigations with 
the expectation that the agency would be barred from bringing a subsequent action based on the 
discovery of new acts and violations." (Appellant's Brief at 19) Based on the foregoing, this Board 
upholds the Hearing Officer's findings regarding the warning language set forth in the January 12, 
2001 Administrative Complaint. 
n. DUE PROCESS CONSISTENCY ISSUES 
On appeal before this Board, Appellant argues that the Hearing Officer erred in finding that 
the Department's termination of his employment did not violate due process consistency standards, 
(Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 23-24) Before addressing Appellant's arguments on this issue, this 
Board notes that Appellant timely and appropriately raised due process consistency concerns during 
the evidentiary proceedings in this matter, (Lunnen v. Utah Dep V of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70 
(Ut App. Ct 1994)) These issues were raised not only during the evidentiary hearing, but were also 
briefed by Appellant in his Post Hearing Brief. (April 4,2003 Tr. at 33-36,44-45)18 
17As set forth above, Mr. Ogilvie testified that during his initial investigation, there were also concerns 
expressed of "some video shots of staff members walking in the CUCF area." (April 3,2003 Tr. at 68) 
18
 Appellant's Post Hearing Brief is part of the file maintained and controlled by the CSRB office. 
Yardlev v. Corrections. Case No. 8 CSRB 77 Paee 18 
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Addressing this issue in his Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer concluded: "In terminating 
Grievant's employment for his misconduct, UDC acted consistently with other cases involving UDC 
employees who engaged in similar misconduct." (Step 5 Decision f7 at 4) Specifically reviewing 
the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, regarding consistency, the Hearing Officer found 
that: 
Grievant cites instances where other UDC employees were rumored to 
have engaged in workplace affairs and yet UDC failed to investigate or 
discipline them ... I am not persuaded that the facts of those cases are 
sufficiently similar to this case to warrant comparison. Indeed, the only 
case factually simitar to this case is one involving another prison guard who 
admitted to videotaping himself masturbating in the tower. The discipline 
imposed in that case by Executive Director Michael Chabries was a 
twenty-day suspension.... I do not find Grievant's argument regarding 
inconsistency of discipline to be persuasive. 
(Step 5 Decision at 6) 
On appeal before this Board, Appellant challenges the Hearing Officer's findings regarding 
consistency on two primaiy grounds. First, Appellant argues that the Hearing Officer "disregarded 
the significant evidence that showed the similarities between the concerns the agency identified with 
Mr. Yardley3 s conduct and the conduct in the cases Mr. Yardley presented to show that the Agency 
did not act consistently." (Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 22) Appellant also asserts that the Hearing 
Officer erred by relying upon evidence not admitted into the record in reaching his decision. 
(Id. at 24) 
In addressing Appellant's concerns, the Board firstnotes that it previously has held that "once 
the agency meets its required burdens, it is then incumbent upon the disciplined employee to show 
by evidence, that the penalty was inconsistent with other prior penalties imposed on similarly 
situated employees under the same or substantially similar circumstances." (Michael D. Hummel 
v. Dep V of Corrections, 5 CSRB 50 at 30 (1994); U Dale King v. Utah Dep 't of Human Services, 
7 CSRB 70 at 24 (2003) (Emphasis added) 
Thorough review of the testimony relied upon by Appellant to establish the Department acted 
inconsistently fails to convince this Board that Appellant's dismissal was inconsistent with the 
Department's actions under substantially similar circumstances. In making this determination, this 
Board notes that none of Appellant's witnesses testified of conduct even remotely similar to 
Appellant's. Moreover, Appellant's argument that the Department acted inconsistently is based 
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entirely on witness testimony regarding rumors and innuendos of workplace affairs that allegedly 
"negatively affected the workplace." (Appellant's Step 6 Brief on Appeal at 22) 
As stated by the Utah Court of Appeals in Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm., 8 P3d 
1048, 1056 (Utah App. 2000): ''Meaningful disparate treatment can only be found when similar 
factual circumstances lead to a different result without explanation." In the instant case, Appellant's 
reliance on rumors and workplace affairs are insufficient to implicate Lunnen due process 
protections. 
The facts of this case establish that Appellant engaged in troubling and egregious conduct, 
not only at home, but also while on duty at CUCF and other pubhc areas. His conduct went well 
beyond "negatively affecting the workplace" as the rumors and innuendos allegedly did. His conduct 
actually prevented him from applying himself to and from fulfilling his assigned duties while on duty 
in the guard tower. It brought discredit on the Department while simultaneously affecting the 
efficiency of the Department's operations all in violation of departmental policy. Based upon these 
factors, this Board does not believe the Hearing Officer "disregarded" significant evidence in 
determining that Appellant failed to show the Department acted inconsistently. 
Finally, the Board will address Appellant's argument that the Hearing Officer erred inrelying 
upon evidence not admitted into the record in making his decision. In addressing this issue, the 
Board first notes that substantial testimony was received into the evidentiary record regarding the 
Department's treatment of another employee who was disciplined for videotaping himself 
masturbating on one occasion while on duty in the CUCF tower. (April2,2003Tr.atl39,145,154-
156; April 3,2003 Tr. at 7) The evidentiary record established that this employee was suspended 
for 20 working days. Moreover, no evidence was resented at the evidentiary hearing bringing these 
facts into dispute. 
Based upon the testimony given regarding this employee, the Board finds no error in the 
Hearing Officer5 s reliance on this evidence to determine whether the Department acted consistently 
in disciplining Appellant. Though it is true that the Department's Final Order regarding its treatment 
of this other employee was not received into the record, there remains substantial testimony that, 
with the limited exception of this other employee, the Department is unaware of any cases involving 
conduct even remotely similar to the conduct relied upon by the Department to terminate Appellant5 s 
Yardley v. Corrections, Case No. 8 CSRB 77 Page 20 
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employment,19 For these reasons, this Board finds no error in the Hearing Officer's decision that the 
Department "acted consistently with other cases" in deciding to dismiss Appellant. (Step 5 Decision 
117 at 4) 
m . REVIEW OF THE INTERNAL PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY 
THE DEPARTMENT DURING THE TERMINATION PROCESS 
On appeal before this Board, Appellant argues that the Department violated his due process 
rights during the tennination process by not conducting an investigation prior to terminating his 
employment and for disregarding its own internal practice of utilizing committee reviews prior to 
imposing discipline. He further argues that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the internal 
procedures followed by the Department during the tennination process afforded Appellant 
appropriate due process protections and substantively complied with all relevant policies, procedures 
and statutes. Essentially, Appellant argues that by not following these internal procedures he was 
"denied the benefit of the exchange of information that would have occurred at those reviews." 
(Appellant's Step 6 Brief on Appeal at 12) 
Regarding the Department's internal investigation, the Hearing Officer specifically found 
that: 
The departmental investigation essentially began and ended to the satisfaction 
of UDC management when Mr. Ogilvie and Mr. Gallegos viewed the second 
video tape on June 11 and 12,2001. Their investigation did not require more. 
(Step 5 Decision at 8) 
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, including the sworn testimony 
of the numerous witnesses and the documents submitted into evidence, this Board concludes that the 
Hearing Officer's finding regarding the Department's internal investigation is reasonable and rational 
and supported by substantial evidence. In so finding, the Board notes that at no time during the 
proceedings before the CSRB has Appellant challenged the factual basis relied upon by the 
Department to terminate his employment. (Appellant's Step 6 Reply Brief at 1) 
Moreover the Board does not believe an extensive i n vestigation was necessary for the 
Department to determine that Appellant's conduct violated departmental policy. Deputy Director 
Gallegos testified: "I couldn't believe what I was seeing because it was much more than just a single 
19The Board finds the evidence presented regarding this employee to be of limited relevance because it 
does not believe his conduct to be "substantially similar" to the admitted conduct of Appellant 
Yardley v. Corrections. Case No. 8 CSRR 77 
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act of masturbation. The film begins with Mr. Yardley in the tower when he's supposed to be, J >v * v" 
working performing various sex acts with himself, a computer screen, a water bottle, over a toilet, v
 y ^ p / 
things up on the computer screen, standing there with a homemade sandwich board type WKT^A - ^ 
with his phone number 1 couldn't believe what I was seeing." (April 23,2003 Tr. at 105-109) \fy r, ~1 
Y*
 ¥ . A > Nothing in rule or statute required the Department to conduct a more foil investigation. r \\ *vr^ 
Based upon these facts, the Board finds the investigative process followed by the Department prior . \ \ p> 
to Appellant's termination comported with due process protections and substantively complied with Cp*, i ^v 
all relevant rules and statutes. y t r y 
Finally, Appellant argues that by not following its practice of using "committee reviews" 
before imposing discipline, the Department violated his due process rights. Appellant argues that 
had the Department utilized committee reviews before recommending his termination, it would have , v
 v ^ 
discovered that the "basis for his termination" was for the same conduct for which he had previously / v * 
been suspended. (Appellant's Step 6 Brief at 12) / i A< i \ 
The facts of the instant case establish that the Department's normal practice in processing * [N^ 
disciplinary actions is to have committees review investigative findings of misconduct to make vC^ 
disciplinary recommendations to the Executive Director. (Carver April 4,2003Tr. at 8-14) There 
are two committees involved in this process. The first is at the "division level" and the second is at 
the "department level" (Id.) In making their recommendations, these committees review such 
things as the facts supporting the allegations, the employee's employment history and mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances such as prior disciplinary actions. (Id.) 
In the instant case, there is no factual dispute that the Department did not follow its normal 
practice of utilizing committee reviews before issuing its Notice of Intent to terminate Appellant's V , \ 
employment. The facts of the instant case also establish however, that prior to his dismissal, r * 
Appellant received a specific and detailed notice of the charges against him and participated in a J 
pretermination hearing before an administrative law judge. (Exs. A-9, A-IO, G-2) 
After carefully reviewing the process afforded Appellant prior to the issuance of the 
Department's Final Order, the Board finds that the Department's failure to utilize committee reviews 
prior to terminating Appellant's employment did not violate due process. In reaching this decision, 
the Board notes that Appellant's rights to due process regarding the termination of his employment 
are found at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5). This statute specifically provides as follows: 
(5) (a) A career service employee may not be . . . dismissed unless . . . 
VmAlwv rnrrertinnv f^elsTn R CSRB 77 Page 22 
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(b) The department head or designated representative notifies the 
employee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal or demotion. 
* * * 
(d) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department head 
or designated representative. 
(e) Following the hearing, the employee may be dismissed ... if the 
department had finds adequate cause or reason. 
(Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5)) 
In the instant case, Appellant was in feet notified in writing of the reasons the Department 
was relying upon to teiminate his employment In addition, he participated in a pretermination 
hearing where he was represented by counsel and evidence was received by the Department's ALJ. 
Importantly, at this pretermination hearing, Appellant was able to argue that the conduct for which 
the Department was seeking termination was the same conduct for which he had previously been 
suspended. 
These factors persuade the Board that while the Department may have failed to "strictly 
comply" with its practice of using committee reviews, fundamental requirements of due process were 
nonetheless met. In reaching this decision, the Board relies on the Utah Court of Appeals decision 
in Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm % 949 P.2d 746, 754 (Utah App. 1997) wherein the 
Court stated: "Although the record shows the Department failed to strictly comply with its 
procedure, the fundamental requirements of due process were met/' 
Moreover, the Board agrees with the Department that any perceived violation of due process 
in the instant case was cured when the Department provided Appellant a pretermination evidentiary 
hearing. At this hearing, Appellant was able to present evidence regarding his prior suspension and 
argue before the Department's ALJ that the conduct for which the Department proposed termination 
of Appellant's employment was the same conduct for which he had previously been suspended. 
Indeed, the facts establish that in his R&R to the Executive Director, the Department's AU based 
his recommendation that Appellant's employment be tenninated solely for the conduct occurring off 
duty, while not in the guard tower. (Ex. A-10) 
In the instant case, the Board finds that Appellant's due process interests were substantially 
satisfied in that he was afforded every procedural right to which he was entitled under law. As the 
Utah Supreme Court stated in Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P,2d 1063, 1066: 
"While exact conformance with the precise terms of termination procedures is doubtless the least 
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controversial course, so long as the substantial interests those procedures are designed to safeguard 
are in fact satisfied and protected, failure to conform to every technical detail of the termination 
procedure is not actionable/5 
In the instant case, Appellant was given notice of the charges against him and participated 
in a fiiO post termination hearing. Therefore, the Board finds no due process violation in the 
Department's decision to not utilize committee reviews during the process leading up to Appellant's 
dismissal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board has addressed each of the issues raised by Appellant in his appeal. After 
thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record, and careftilly studying the issues raised by Appellant 
before this Board, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decision for the reasons set forth herein 
and hereby dismisses Appellant's appeal to this Board The Board finds the Hearing Officer's 
decision to be reasonable and rational and sitpported by substantial evidence. Based upon the 
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the Board finds the Department had 
adequate cause and reason to terminate Appellant's employment. 
DATED this 23rd day of December 2004. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS 
Felix J, McGowan, Acting Chair 
Joan M. Gallegos, Member 
Kevin C. Timken, Member . 
Felix J. McGowan 
Acting Chair 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency action 
by complying with Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(10), and Utah Code §63-46b-l3, Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to 
Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
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